Hegel says, then, that Time is something, an X, that exists empirically. Now, this assertion can be deduced from the very analysis of the Hegelian notion of (historical) Time. Time in which the Future takes primacy can be realized, can exist, only provided that it negates or annihilates. In order that Time may exist, therefore, there must also be something other than Time. This other thing is first of all Space (as it were, the place where things are stopped). Therefore: no Time without Space; Time is something that is in Space. Time is the negation of Space (of diversity); but if it is something and not nothingness, it is because it is the negation of Space. Now, only that which really exists – that is, which resists – can be really negated. But space that resists is full: it is extended matter, it is real Space – that is, the natural World. Therefore, Time must exist in a World: it is indeed, then, something which "ist da,"as Hegel says, which is there in a Space, and which is there in empirical Space – that is, in a sensible Space or a natural World. Time annihilates this world by causing it at every instant to sink into the nothingness of the past. But Time is nothing but this nihilation of the World; and if there were no real World that was annihilated, Time would only be pure nothingness: there would be no Time. Hence Time that is, therefore, is indeed something that "exists empirically" – i.e., exists in a real Space or a spatial World.

Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (Cornell University Press, 1980) pp. 136-137