There is necessarily a plurality of interpretations

It is possible, for example, to interpret 'history' as the history of class struggle, or of the struggle of races for supremacy, or as the history of religious ideas, or as the history of the struggle between the 'open' and the 'closed' society, or as the history of scientific and industrial progress. All these are more or less interesting points of view, and as such perfectly unobjectionable. But historicists do not present them as such; they do not see that there is necessarily a plurality of interpretations which are fundamentally on the same level of both suggestiveness and arbitrariness (even though some of them may be distinguished by their fertility – a point of some importance). Instead, they present them as doctrines or theories, asserting that 'all history is the history of class struggle', etc. And if they actually find that their point of view is fertile, and that many facts can be ordered and interpreted in this light, then they mistake this for a confirmation, or even for a proof, of their doctrine.

Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Routledge Classics, 2002) p. 140

The central mistake of historicism

This, we may say, is the central mistake of historicism. Its 'laws of development' turn out to be absolute trends; trends which, like laws, do not depend on initial conditions, and which carry us irresistibly in a certain direction into the future. They are the basis of unconditional prophecies, as opposed to conditional scientific predictions.

Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Routledge Classics, 2002) p. 118

The meaning of scientific statements

How are we to grasp the meaning of scientific statements bearing explicitly upon manifestation of the world that is posited as anterior to the emergence of thought and even of life – posited, that is, as anterior to every form of human relation to the world? Or, to put it more precisely: how are we to think the meaning of a discourse which construes the relation to the world – that of thinking and/or living – as a fact inscribed in a temporality within which this relation is just one event among others, inscribed in an order of succession in which it is merely a stage, rather than an origin?

Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude (Continuum, 2008) pp. 9-10

The choice between arts and sciences

As in the political sphere, the child is taught that he is free, a democrat, with a free will and a free mind, lives in a free country, makes his own decisions. At the same time he is a prisoner of the assumptions and dogmas of his time, which he does not question, because he has never been told they exist. By the time a young person has reached the age when he has to choose [...] between the arts and the sciences, he often chooses the arts because he feels that here is humanity, freedom, choice. He does not know that he is already moulded by a system: he does not know that the choice itself is the result of a false dichotomy rooted in the heart of our culture.

Doris Lessing, The Golden Notebook (Flamingo Modern Classic, 2002) p. 15

Genernas programkod lika välordnad, i grunden lika reduktionistiskt enkel, om än i praktiken mer komplex genom sin blotta omfattning. På denna mikroskopiska nivå förstoras vetenskapens begränsning upp till tydlighet: förståelse omdefinieras till kvantifiering, insikt blir till indentifikation. Om vi vet vilka signalsubstanser som produceras i hjärnan då vi älskar, har vi förstått kärlek? Genom att kartlägga det mänskliga genomet, förklarar vi människan? Möjligen, om vi omdefinierar också henne, till hormonproduktion och egenintresse. Den själviska människan, styrd av den själviska genen: kanske är hennes förklaring inget annat än en utdragen sekvens av ATGC.

Helena Granström, Alltings Mått (Ruin, 2008) pp. 100-101